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By Nicholas L. Georgahopoulos*
After a long period of silence about rcorganization law, the United States Supreme Court's
Jevic opinion offered the opportunity for clarification and updtitng. Instead, Jevic gives a
narrow holding against structured dismissals but has potent undercurrents about first-day
orders, fccs, and settlements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world dominance of the bankruptcy practice by the United States is, in
part, a result of the thick interpretation that reorganization law enjoys.' The
U.S. Supreme Court added a layer of interpretation by issuing its opinion in
Jevic in March 2017 .2 The lower court erred by ordering a dismissal of the bank-
ruptcy of Jevic and approving a settlement that produced value for unsecured
creditors while the priority claims of employees had not been satisfied.
Understanding Jevic, however, is not simple. The argued question eventually
came to be the propriety of structured dismissals, a term describing the practice
of dismissing a chapter 11 filing while retaining some consequences of bankruptcy
law (as opposed to the default of restoring the previous state of affairs). 3 In Jevic,
the dismissal also allocated value among claimants and barred the employee cred-
itors from waging a fraudulent transfer attack against the leveraged buyout of Jevic
by its last owners. In the background is the propriety of first-day orders and of
transactions (known as § 363 sales, including settlements) that influence distribu-
tions to claimants. This article probes Jevic, revealing three undercurrents. First,
the court's dicta about first-day orders and interim approvals of settlements are im-
portant for bankruptcy practice. Second, the court was not far from addressing
courts' attitudes toward fees, especially legal fees- the academy has long discussed
the race-to-the-top or to-the-bottom nature of the jurisdictional competition for
bankruptcy filings, and the Court could have addressed that. Third, the centrality
of assessing settlements that fund endeavors-litigation in Jevic's counterpoint,
Iridium -leads to a discussion of the biases those produce.
The expedition to conquer Jevic begins in Part II with conventional, statutory,
Code-authorized exits from reorganization: reorganization plans ("plans"), con-
versions to chapter 7, and dismissals, juxtaposed to unconventional but not un-
usual ends by sub rosa plans through § 363 sales and structured dismissals. Part
III first explains the facts of Jevic-the leveraged buyout ("LBO") fraudulent
1. The only other jurisdiction with a potential claim to attract cross-border insolvency filings is the
United Kingdom but it does not do so. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bank-
ruptcy Tourists, 70 Bus. LAW. 719, 740-45 (2015) (studying a sample of filings by large foreign busi-
nesses and discussing the reasons that the United Kingdom has failed to attract significant insolvency
filings); see also, e.g., Patrick Fitzgerald, South Korea's Hangin Shipping Files jor U.S. Bankruptcy Protec-
ion, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2016) [archived at http://perma.cc/6PTB-7EA7]; Press Release, Cleary Gott-
lieb, Chilean Bus Operator in Prepackaged Bankruptcy (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.clearygottlieb.
com/news-and-insights/news-listing/chilean-bus-operato r-in-prepackaged-bankruptcy65 [archived
at http://perma.cc/Z4LC-5RYE] (reporting the prepackaged filing of bus operators Alsacia and Ex-
press and a prior representation of a different Chilean business by Cleary Gottlieb, electricity provider
Edelnor); Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/spreadsheet.htm [archived at
https://perma.cc/S7Z2-FDVX] (accessed Apr. 20, 2017) (sort by headquarter city, scroll to "Outside
the United States," screen 16-17, indicating twenty-one filings of businesses headquartered abroad
totaling over thirty billion in annual sales, which do not include Hanjin, Alsacia & Express, and Edel-
nor, as the database is limited to businesses that file SEC Form 10-K).
2. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
3. Earlier, according to the grant of certiorari, the issue was the propriety of approving settlements.
Id. at 987 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We granted certiorari to decide '[w]hether a bankruptcy court
may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority
scheme.' Pet. for Cert. i," and the Court should dismiss due to this change.).
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transfer claims, their settlement, and the employees' mass layoff notice claims
(WARN Act claims)-and the narrow holding. Part IV explores the powerful un-
dercurrents of this case- first, the dicta guiding discretion in first-day orders and
interim settlement approvals, and second, the implications about fee attitudes.
Part IV also introduces a discussion of the dynamics of settlements inside the re-
organization process, which divides in two: the propriety of priority-violating
settlements, and the difference between the class that should litigate versus
the class that should settle a dispute. The conclusion stresses the narrow nature
of the holding and the expansive implications of these undercurrents.
II. EXITS: STATUTORY AND NOT
The statutorily foreseen ways to exit a reorganization are plans, conversions to
liquidation, and dismissals. These exit strategies are discussed in Subpart A. Ju-
dicial discretion 4 and practice have created two more ways to exit a reorganiza-
tion. Subpart B discusses sub rosa plans through § 363 sales, and Subpart C dis-
cusses structured dismissals.
A. PLANS, CONVERSIONS, AND DISMISSALS
The Bankruptcy Code provides for three specific ends to a reorganization pro-
cess. Section 1129 offers an exit with either a consensual plan-subsection (a)-
or a nonconsensual one-subsection (b). If the reorganization does not end with
a plan, then the Code establishes that the case may be converted to a liquidation
under chapter 7, § 1112, or may be dismissed under § 349, which primarily en-
visions an undoing of the consequences of the bankruptcy. Plans of reorganiza-
tion can be liquidating in that they distribute the proceeds of sales-mostly
§ 363 sales. True restructurings often enable a business to overcome the freeze
of insolvency and continue as a viable going concern. The non-liquidating reor-
ganization plan constitutes the ultimate successful exit from a reorganization pro-
cess, as it means the business is worth retaining as a going concern.' The plan
reschedules the claims against the business-obligations to creditors and share-
holders' equity claims-in a way that ensures that a viable business emerges.
6
If all classes of claimants agree with the appropriate majorities, then the reorgani-
4. Judicial discretion is a central feature of bankruptcy law, with the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")
giving an open-ended authorization for it in 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) ("The court may issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title."), and repeatedly and expressly allowing courts to deviate from its mandates, pertinently in
the section on dismissals, which begins with "unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise," id. § 349.
5. The Code ensures that only businesses worth more as going concerns get reorganized by giving dis-
senting minority creditors a right to receive as much as or more than in liquidation, id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)
(each holder of a claim who has not accepted the plan "will receive .. under the plan .. value .. not
less than the amount that such holder would so receive . . . if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7").
6. The Code requires that the reorganized entity is not likely to seek protection from its creditors
again in the foreseeable future, id. § 1129(a)(11) ("Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be fol-
lowed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor .... ").
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zation is consensual under § 1129(a), with dissenting minorities principally being
entitled to liquidation value. 7 If one or more classes of claimants objects, provided
that at least one impaired class consents, then the court may confirm a noncon-
sensual plan under § 1129(b). In nonconsensual plans, dissenting classes are en-
titled to additional protections, the relevant one here being their priority. Priority,
also known as the absolute priority rule, means that each class is either paid in full
or that no class junior to that class receives any value.
9
Conversions to chapter 7 liquidations are the Code's envisioned fate for busi-
nesses that prove that they should not be maintained as going concerns. 1 Many
sales are conducted during an attempted reorganization, and liquidating reorga-
nization plans are common, obviating this conversion. The final alternative is
dismissal. The Code's vision of dismissal is primarily a return to the situation
that would have existed if the bankruptcy filing never took place. "
B. SUB ROSA PLANS THROUGH § 363 SALES
Whereas the usual sale that the Code envisions is for cash, large transactions
will often have more texture. 12 Buyers may wish to retain staff and key suppliers
and dealers or pay without cash (i.e., by means of debt, equity, or other rights).
When the buyer retains staff or other relations and gives rights rather than cash,
the transaction is no longer a simple conversion of the debtor's assets for an
amount of cash that can be distributed according to priorities. The debtor's
counterparties who receive employment by the buyer or other rights against
the buyer (such claimants are seen as "following the assets" as opposed to staying
behind in the reorganization to receive the proceeds of the sale) may end up
being treated differently than they would be otherwise, and the rights that the
7. See supra note 5.
8. The requirement that one impaired class upports the plan comes from the language of § 1129(b)
requiring that all subparagraphs of subsection (a) other than (a)(8) are met, which requires that (a)(10)
be met, requiring that "at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider."
9. Section 1129(b) requires the plan to be fair and equitable, which it defines to mean observa-
tion of priorities, meaning, for example, for unsecured creditors, that if they do not receive "value...
equal to the amount of their] claim" per (b)(2)(B)(i), then "the holder of any claim or interest that is
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property" per (ii). Id. § 1129(b).
10. Id. § 1112 (establishing the power of the debtor and of the court to convert a chapter 11 case
to chapter 7 or dismiss).
11. Id. § 349 ("(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under
section 742 of this title-(I) reinstates-(A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded under sec-
tion 543 of this title; (B) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a)
of this title, or preserved under section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551 of this title; and (C) any lien
voided under section 506(d) of this title; (2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered,
under section 522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and (3) revests the property of the estate in
the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case
under this title." (emphasis added)).
12. The sales discussed here are those outside the debtor's ordinary course of business. Sales in the
ordinary course of business do not need court approval, id. § 363(c)(1). Sales that liquidate a large
part of the debtor or change the debtor's business line will almost necessarily be outside the ordinary
course of business and, therefore, need court approval, id. § 363(b).
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buyer gives may have different value for different creditors. An extreme example
is the travel vouchers that were proposed in Braniff, which were much more valu-
able to individuals than to corporate claimants (and which were not allowed)13
Despite these quirks, sales are eminently desirable. The law would be fool-
hardy to insist on cash-only transactions in the face of a deteriorating debtor, ne-
gotiation impasses, and the myriad of difficulties of a reorganization. Sales realize
value, preserve going-concern value, resolve uncertainties, and restore produc-
tivity in ways that fundamentally promote the goals of the reorganization for
the parties and the economy at large. Yet, these transactions likely produce de-
viations from the distributions that a cash-only sale would enable-deviations
that partly depend on the future performance of the buyer-and they are, there-
fore, unknown at the time of the transaction. Depending on the subsequent suc-
cess of the business under the buyer, counterparties that follow the assets may
receive superior or inferior treatment. 14 Claimants receiving rights will realize
different values depending on status (e.g., those receiving equity doing better
in success and those receiving secured debt experiencing better protection in
failure). Sales that have distributional consequences are called sub rosa reorgani-
zation plans-sub rosa meaning "covert"-because the sale distributes the value
of the debtor outside the process of plan approval per § 1129.15
The conflict between the attraction of sales and their distributional conse-
quences creates a conundrum- insisting on cash-only sales could be destructive.
The cash-only sales necessary for exact compliance with § 1129 may be impos-
sible due to time and structural reasons. Courts have overcome this conflict by
importing protections of § 1129 to sales that have distributional consequences. 16
Scholarship 17 and the ABI Chapter 11 Reform Report'8 agree.
13. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935
(5th Cir. 1983).
14. The ultimate, almost, example of a § 363 sale followed by success is that of Chrysler. The deal-
ers and retiree claimants, who would have fared extremely poorly in a liquidation, were essentially
paid in full. See generally Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MiCH.
L. REv. 727 (2010).
15. Technically, a formal reorganization plan will follow § 363 sales, usually a liquidating one,
distributing the proceeds of the sale to the claimants that were left behind. Objecting and even de-
feating that plan, however, would not invalidate the prior § 363 sale, making the sale the salient point
during which claimants' rights need to be assessed.
16. See, e.g., Institutional Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Air
Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1986) ("If the court concludes that there has in actuality
been such a denial tof a right that the objecting creditor would have under § 1129], it may then con-
sider fashioning appropriate protective measures modeled on those which would attend a reorganiza-
tion plan."); In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[W]here
a tsettlement] transaction would free assets for distribution, and circumvent no Chapter 11 right, it may
be approved as a necessary step toward, or building block of, a plan of reorganization."); see generally
Craig Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan oj Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16
BA w. Dv. J. 37 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 735-36 ("If a class consented overall but a dissenter
would clearly be getting liquidation value, then the court could determine that even though the sale
had aspects of a sub rosa plan, those features if done above-board would still have permitted plan
confirmation under § 1129.").
18. AM. BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY THE REaORM OF CHAPTER 11, 2012-2014 FiNAL REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 206 (2014) thereinafter ABI CHAPTER I 11 REFORM REPORT] ("the Commission ultimately
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Sales are important for understanding Jevic; by virtue of involving a settle-
ment, it involved a sale, and from an analytical perspective, settlements are
sales. In a settlement, the estate's asset is a claim that gets replaced by a different
asset through the settlement. If the settlement were for cash, no distributional
issues would arise, because the cash could be distributed in the bankruptcy pro-
cess with exactitude. Yet, settlements can have additional complexities.
The key opinion on the application of § 363 in settlements that have distribu-
tive consequences is the Second Circuit's Iridium, which is repeatedly cited in
Jevic.19 Motorola created a subsidiary, Iridium Operating LLC ("Iridium"), later
spun off, to pursue global, satellite-based, mobile telephony. Iridium missed
its target number of subscribers by almost 99 percent, leading to bankruptcy. 20
All of its assets were encumbered in favor of lenders led by JP Morgan Chase
Bank ("Chase"). Motorola held large claims and administrative claims. Unse-
cured creditors sought to challenge Chase's priority and impose liability on Mo-
torola for its treatment of Iridium. 2 1 The creditors reached a settlement with
Chase that in part allocated funds to an entity that would pursue the litigation
against Motorola, thus (a) allocating the proceeds of the settlement to the exclu-
sion of Motorola, and (b) by allocating the ownership of the litigation entity, ap-
portioning the potential proceeds of the litigation against Motorola. 22 The Sec-
ond Circuit adopted a balancing test, allowing small deviations from the
scheme of § 1129 for "good business" reasons:
Here, the bankruptcy court identified a proper business justification for the Settle-
ment. By allowing [Chasel to take $92.5 million and redirect another $37.5 million
to the [litigation entityl in exchange for the Committee dropping the challenge to the
liens, the Committee has cleared the way for implementation of a reorganization
plan. The Estate stands to gain significantly more from the action against Motorola
than it might if it or the Committee were forced to fund the litigation themselves at
some much later date.... In short, the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding
that the settlement of the dispute of the liens .. had a proper business justification
and was "a step towards possible confirmation of a plan of reorganization and not an
evasion of the plan confirmation process. ,23
determined that creditors should be afforded at least the same level of protection in the section 363x
sale process and in the chapter 11 plan process").
19. In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) thereinafter Indium]. The Supreme
Court's opinion mentions Indium five times in the majority and once in the dissent. The Third Circuit
opinion mentions Iridium fifteen times.
20. Id. at 456-57 (noting Iridium had a little over 10,000 subscribers when a million were pro-
jected for its viability-missing the target by about 99 percent).
21. Id. at 458 ("The Committee argued that Iridium had causes of action against Motorola for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.... According
to the Committee, while Iridium was still a subsidiary 'Motorola caused Iridium to execute a series of
one-sided, overreaching contracts extremely lucrative to Motorola and grossly unfair to Iridium from
a financial, legal and risk allocation perspective.' The Committee further alleges that even after the
spinoff, Motorola continued to dominate Iridium through a parasitic relationship that insulated Mo-
torola from any risk associated with Iridium.").
22. See in]ra note 82 and accompanying text.
23. Indium, 478 F.3d at 467.
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This sheds a particular light on the Iridium setting. The debtor has claims
against two creditors, Chase and Motorola. The settlement with one funds the
pursuit of the other. The court finds that this scheme promotes the purposes
of disentangling the affairs of the debtor while offering the opportunity to in-
crease the size of the estate, despite that the second creditor, Motorola, is ex-
cluded from the settlement's proceeds in a deviation from proper priorities. 24
C. STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
Dismissals that do not erase the consequences of the bankruptcy filing are
known as structured dismissals because the dismissal order contains language
preventing the restoration of the status quo ante. Although the Code did not fore-
see structured dismissals, they have become virtually unavoidable. Moreover, the
Code itself gave the bankruptcy court the authority to deviate for cause from dis-
missals that simply restore the status quo ante. 25
To maintain the going concern, preserve value, or pursue opportunities for in-
creasing the estate, the estate may benefit by giving rights or making payments to
claimants or third parties. For example, the estate could waive security interests
of the debtor against a creditor that becomes a post-petition lender, known as a
debtor-in-possession lender ("DIP lender") .26 If dismissals removed all conse-
quences of bankruptcy, then dismissals would undermine those efforts of the
debtor. Instead, if the court authorized such transactions, and the subsequent
dismissal preserved the consequences of those transactions, then the dismissal
becomes a structured dismissal instead of a simply restorative dismissal.
If DIP lenders could not rely on any rights or liens they obtained during the
bankruptcy, then DIP lenders would be less willing to lend and would charge
higher interest rates. Making financing reorganizations rarer and more expensive
directly impedes the function of bankruptcy law as a revitalizer of productivity
frozen by insolvency. 27 During the Jevic oral argument, even the opponents of
that structured dismissal acknowledged the desirability of structured dismissals
that uphold appropriate reliance interests. 2 All sides agreed that hampering DIP
24. However, the claims against Motorola eventually failed. See injra notes 84-85 and accompa-
nying text.
25. See supra note 11.
26. This example was used in oral argument. See injra note 29.
27. See generally John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 AM.
L. & EcoN. Pv. 303 (2008) (empirical showing of correlation of lenient bankruptcy law with entre-
preneurial activity); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Lawjor Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
Rv. 51 (2002).
28. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 137 S. Ct.
973 (2017) thereinafterjevic Transcript] (Ms. Spinelli for petitioners- "the 'for cause' provision in Sec-
tion 349(b) was intended to protect parties who took actions in reliance on the bankruptcy"); id. at
14-15 ("Section 349 says that-that the default when a bankruptcy case is dismissed is that certain
transactions that occurred during the case, such as avoidance actions, get unwound, liens that have
been voided are reinstated, and property remaining in the estate is returned to its prebankruptcy
owner. In other words, the bankruptcy is undone as far as possible. The cause exception is an excep-
tion to that. So what the cause exception permits a bankruptcy court to do is to maintain the status
quo at the time of dismissal when there is good reason to do so. And the typical good reason would be
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lending by avoiding rights granted to DIP lenders would be counterproductive.
The same argument applies to any other counterparty that the estate needs to
perform on a timely basis during the bankruptcy. While this appears to be
most likely in financing the debtor's reorganization attempt, the debtor may
need urgent care even if the debtor is going out of business but has sensitive as-
sets (e.g., idling refineries, plants, or satellite systems).
Hand-in-hand with structured dismissals go the orders, issued by the court at
the beginning of the case, that allow those transactions. Their desirability was
conceded at oral argument. 29 Those first-day orders were expressly approved
by dicta in the Jevic opinion, provided that they promote appropriate bankruptcy
interests) ° The ABI Chapter 11 Reform Report agrees." The corresponding theo-
retical analysis is even more permissive, building on the idea that the underlying
relations are akin to an executory contract that the debtor may assume (and,
thus, cure any defaults) with even less scrutiny 32
III. JEvIc: FACTS AND OPINION
Having understood the role of statutory and nonstatutory exits from the reor-
ganization process, we now turn to the complicated facts of Jevic. In chronolog-
ical order, the facts are a leveraged buyout, the failure of the business, the firing
of the employees, the bankruptcy filing, the settlement of fraudulent transfer
claims against the parent and the LBO lender in the structured dismissal, and
the adjudication of the employees' claims for inadequate notice of their mass lay-
off under the WARN Act. Subpart A discusses the leveraged buyout, the fraud-
ulent transfer claims, and their settlement. Subpart B is about the employees'
wage and inadequate notice (WARN Act) claims. Subpart C explains the U.S. Su-
preme Court's narrow holding prohibiting nonconsensual structured dismissals.
A. THE LBO FRAUDULENT TRANSFER CLAIMS
Jevic Holding Corporation ("Jevic") was a subsidiary of a larger transportation
company until 2006, when, on June 30, Sun Capital Partners IV, LP ("Sun"), a
private equity fund, acquired it for $77.4 million, taking a $90 million bridge
loan from Bank of Montreal (to cover not only the entire purchase price but
also associated fees), refinanced within a month from CIT Group/Business
reliance by a party on something that happened during the bankruptcy case."); id. at 21 (Ms. Har-
rington for the United States: "tPayments violating priorities based on interim orders] are generally
premised on a-on a prediction that-that allowing that kind of distribution will ultimately result
in every creditor getting more money at the end of the day.").
29. Id. at 13-14 (Ms. Spinelli, for the employees, discussing In re Wiese where dismissal did not
allow the reinstatement of lien that the debtor had released in order to get financing).
30. See in]ra note 66 and accompanying text.
31. ABI CHAPTER I 11 REFORM REPORT, supra note 18, at 87-91 (discussing the "payment of certain
claims upon filing").
32. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) ("[T]he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or re-
ject any executory contract ... of the debtor.").
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Credit, Inc. ("CIT") .3 3 The refinancing produced two loans totaling a little over
$101 million, an $85 million revolving line of credit ("revolver"), and a $16.2
million term loan. Sun was not an obligor or guarantor under these loans, mak-
ing them, colloquially, nonrecourse. The loans were secured with first liens on
all of Jevic's assets, and the term loan was separately secured by real estate.
Jevic was immediately in violation of loan covenants and, to obtain CIT's forbear-
ance, sold and leased back the real estate. The proceeds repaid the term loan in
full and reduced the revolver's balance to $55 million. Jevic's financial condition
deteriorated further, requiring further forbearance by CIT, until February 2008,
when Jevic hired an investment bank to find a buyer. In early April, Jevic at-
tempted a restructuring that would have been completed in June. Rapidly dete-
riorating circumstances amid the onset of the Great Recession and the absence of
viable buyers forced its board to authorize a bankruptcy filing on May 16, 2008.
Jevic gave a termination notice to its employees on May 19, announced that it
was ceasing operations, filed for bankruptcy on May 20, and later conducted
a § 363 sale of its assets.
To summarize, Sun bought Jevic with no cash but with a large nonrecourse
loan from CIT secured by Jevic's assets (i.e., in an extremely leveraged buyout).
Then, Jevic proved unable to sustain its debt as the Great Recession unfolded.
Jevic fired its employees, shut down, and entered a liquidating chapter 11.
The LBO claims are explained in four steps. The first step explains the principles
of the application of fraudulent transfer law in LBOs. The second step reveals the
transfer. The third step explains the subordination remedy. The fourth step dis-
cusses the settlement in Jevic.
1. LBO Fraudulent Transfer Principles
Leveraged buyouts that fail may give rise to fraudulent transfer claims in favor
of creditors. The usual structure of leveraged buyouts has an LBO lender enable
an acquirer to buy a target with the LBO lender getting claims against only the
target-not the acquirer-secured by the assets of the target. In practice, various
considerations produce variations, but the typical transaction has the acquirer
form a corporation that initially has no assets, i.e., is a shell corporation. The ac-
quirer endows the shell with some cash, the acquirer's equity (although in Jevic's
case the acquirer contributed no cash). The shell also borrows the bulk of the
purchase price from the LBO lender and grants to the LBO lender a security in-
terest in all assets of the shell. Although at this moment the shell has no assets
other than cash, this soon changes- the shell spends its cash (i.e., the acquirer's
equity and the loan) to acquire the target's shares from its shareholders and
merges with the target, two steps that become a single merger transaction.
Upon the merger, as the two corporations become one, the obligation to the
33. The facts in this paragraph come from an amalgamation of the facts of two bankruptcy court
opinions, one on the fraudulent transfer claims and one on the workers' WARN Act claims, In rejevic
Holdings Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS), 2011 WL 4345204, at * 1 (Bankr D. Del. Sept. 15, 2011); In re
Jevic Holdings Corp., 496 B.R. 151, 154-56 (Bankr D. Del. 2013).
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LBO lender and the lien in favor of the LBO lender become an obligation of the
merged entity, and upon the proper filings to perfect the security interest, a lien
attaches to all assets of the merged entity. The assets of the merged entity are
only the assets of the target, the cash of the shell having gone to the old share-
holders of the target. Through this transaction, the claim of the LBO lender takes
priority over unsecured claims against the target. LBO practice may further ag-
gravate the target's finances, for example, by the acquirer charging fees to the tar-
get for managing it, as is the practice of some private equity acquirers, or by the
target distributing dividends to the acquirer.
3 4
If the merged entity fails, as Jevic did, then the preexisting creditors of the tar-
get are, quite naturally, harmed by the leveraged buyout. If the leveraged buyout
had not occurred, the target would have less debt and may not have failed, and
its creditors' claims would be first in line for payment instead of queueing be-
hind the LBO lender. Fraudulent transfer law may give them a remedy. Natu-
rally, the creditors of Jevic sought to use fraudulent transfer law against CIT's
offending priority and to recover any funds that Sun may have obtained from
Jevic.
Fraudulent transfer law prohibits transactions of two kinds, those intended to
"hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors35 (called intentional fraud in the traditional
language of fraudulent transfer law) and transactions that leave the debtor in
three specific poor financial positions without the debtor obtaining reasonably
34. Justice Breyer's opinion explains this-
In a leveraged buyout, the buyer (B tor acquirer]) typically borrows from a third party (T tor
LBO lender]) a large share of the funds needed to purchase a company (C tor target]). B
then pays the money to C's shareholders. Having bought the stock, B owns C. B then pledges
C's assets to T so that T will have security for its loan. Thus, if the selling price for C is $50
million, B might use $10 million of its own money, borrow $40 million from T, pay $50 million
to C's shareholders, and then pledge C assets worth $40 million (or more) to T as security for T's
$40 million loan. If B manages C well, it might make enough money to pay T back the $40 mil-
lion and earn a handsome profit on its own $10 million investment. But, if the deal sours and C
descends into bankruptcy, beware of what might happen: Instead of C's $40 million in assets
being distributed to its existing creditors, the money will go to T to pay back T's loan-the
loan that allowed B to buy C. (T will receive what remains of C's assets because T is now a se-
cured creditor, putting it at the top of the priority list.).
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 980 (2017).
Justice Breyer's explanation uses the terms buyer (B), third party lender (T), and company (C)
whereas the explanation in the text uses the terms acquirer, LBO lender, and target, but the substance
is the same. In the setting ofJevic, Sun (the acquirer or B) created a shell to borrow from CIT (the LBO
lender or T) and buy Jevic (the target or C). The creditors of the old Jevic found themselves queueing
for distributions from the failed merged entity, behind CIT's secured claim.
35. The state law source of fraudulent transfer law is usually one of the corresponding uniform
acts, ranging from the most recent Uniform Voidable Transactions Act ("UVTA"), its marginally dif-
ferent predecessor-the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act-which was intended to be synergistic
with the Bankruptcy Code, or the significantly older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act; bank-
ruptcy has parallel provisions in § 548. Intentional fraud: 15. U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012) ("The trustee
may avoid any transfer .. if the debtor... (A) made such transfer .. with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was ... indebted."); UVTA § 4(a)(1) (2016) ("A
transfer made ... is voidable ... if the debtor made tit] (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any creditor .... ").
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equivalent value (constructive fraud). The three poor positions are insolvency, in-
ability to service one's debts, and unreasonably small assets.36
The ordinary remedy that fraudulent transfer law provides is avoidance of the
offending transfer. 3  In the case of leveraged buyouts, however, identifying
the offending transfer is difficult, and avoidance of the transfer to the selling
shareholders is excessive if the selling shareholders had no bad faith. Both the
Bankruptcy Code and fraudulent transfer law also let the court devise any
other appropriate remedy. 3 The remedy that the courts often devise is the sub-
ordination of the claims of the LBO lender and any claims of the acquirer
2. Unearthing the Transfer
The application of fraudulent transfer law in leveraged buyouts faces the dif-
ficulty that the offending transfer is obscured by the flexibility of mergers in
modern corporate practice. To see the transfer, some digging is necessary.
One must separate in time the acquisition of the target's shares from the merger
so as to suppose that the target continues to exist after the acquisition as a wholly
owned subsidiary of the shell. The setting is that the acquirer created the shell
and endowed it with some equity, and that the shell borrowed from the LBO
lender and spent all its cash acquiring all of the target's shares. But the merger
has not yet occurred. Therefore, the LBO lender is only a lender to the shell,
and its security interest only covers the shell's assets, i.e., the shares of the target,
rather than the assets of the target. In this setting, for cash to reach the LBO
lender, the shell must have the target declare dividends to the shell, which
can then pay its obligations to the LBO lender.
Consider the position of the creditors of the target at this moment. They are
sufficiently protected by fraudulent transfer law because the target cannot de-
clare dividends that would render it insolvent or unable to service its debts. Div-
idends are transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value-for no value. The
payment of such a dividend would be constructive fraud and avoidable.
Consider next, that instead of the merger, an equivalent outcome arises from a
longer sequence of simpler transactions. The shell has already borrowed from
the LBO lender and acquired the shares of the target. Now, the target borrows
36. 15 U.s.c. § 548(a)(1)(B) ("The trustee may avoid any transfer ... if the debtor ... (B)(i)
received less than reasonably equivalent value .. and (ii)(I) was insolvent... ; (II) thad] unreason-
ably small capital [for the line of business]; tor] (II1) thad] debts that would be beyond the debtor's
ability to pay as such debts matured."); UVTA §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a) (2016) (§ 4(a): "A transfer... is void-
able... if the debtor made tit]: ... (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value... and the
debtor: (i) was ... in a business... for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small... ; or (ii)... reasonably should have believed that the ]debtor's] debts ]would be] beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as they became due."; § 5(a): "A transfer made... is voidable... if the debtor
made the transfer .. without receiving a reasonably equivalent value .. and the debtor .. became
insolvent as a result .... ").
37. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) ("The trustee may avoid any transfer ).... ; UVTA § 7(a)(1) (2016) ((a)
"a creditor ... may obtain: (1) avoidance of the transfer").
38. UVTA § 7(a)(3)(iii) (2016) (a creditor may obtain "any other relief the circumstances may re-
quire"); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is nec-
essary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
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from the LBO lender an amount equal to the shell's indebtedness to the LBO
lender. The target then sends that amount as a dividend to the shell- the shell
then repays its loan to the LBO lender and dissolves, distributing its assets-
the shares of the target-to its shareholders. The new loan comes from the
LBO lender and is secured by the target's assets. Therefore, the end result is iden-
tical to the single-step transaction: the acquirer owns the target, and the target's
assets secure the obligation to the LBO lender. 39 However, in this sequence, the
transfer that may be fraudulent is visible. The application of fraudulent transfer
law focuses on the dividend. If the target does not become insolvent or unable to
service its debts by distributing this dividend, then this transaction does not vi-
olate fraudulent transfer law. Worth noting is that, as long as the LBO lender is
pursuing its own self-interest as a long-term lender to the target as a going con-
cern, then the LBO lender would ensure that the target continues to be viable
and able to service its debts, which include the obligation to the LBO lender.
3. The Subordination Remedy
Because the outcome of the leveraged buyout is possible without the single-
transaction shortcut of the merger, fraudulent transfer law also has no reason
to stand in the way of producing this result with a single step-through a merger
of the shell with the target while the target's shares are still owned by its old
shareholders (in which merger, target's shareholders only receive cash-the eq-
uity and loan proceeds of the shell). The separation of the merger into its con-
stituent steps, however, reveals the potentially offending transfer: the large divi-
dend from the target to the shell that enables the LBO lender to become a
creditor of the target. One may justifiably think that when this dividend is vis-
ible, then the court that applies fraudulent transfer law would more easily enjoin
it or void it as a fraudulent transfer. However, courts have effectively protected
creditors in single-step LBO transactions, mostly by subordinating LBO lenders'
claims. 4° Seen from the perspective of the disaggregated transaction, if the hypo-
thetical dividend would have violated fraudulent transfer law, then the LBO
lender should not be allowed to become a secured creditor of the target. Subor-
dination of the LBO lender's claim makes the claims of other creditors of the tar-
get have priority over the LBO lender.
That leveraged buyouts, despite good faith, may give rise to subordination of
LBO lenders' claims per fraudulent transfer law is best exemplified in O'Day. 41 In
this opinion of extraordinary length and detail, the court found that the LBO
lender, Meritor, that enabled the acquirer, Funston, to buy the target (the sail-
boat manufacturer O'Day), was too aggressive and too optimistic. 42 Rather
39. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Fraudulent Transfers III-Leveraged Buyouts, www.cali.org/
lesson/16127 [archived at https://perma.cc/4CLS-EK6U] (last accessed June 29, 2017) (CALl lesson
including animated visuals of the sequence of transactions).
40. See, e.g., Murphy v. Mentor Savings Bank (In re O'Day), 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 407 ("The Court finds, therefore, that the earnings assumptions upon which Jones [of
Mentor, the LBO lender] and Funston based their projections were unreasonable and, as a result,
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than the acquirer shopping for an LBO lender, the LBO lender found the ac-
quirer. 4 3 Rather than a low-fee long-term loan, the LBO lender extracted large
fees upfront44 as well as a range of interest rates, reaching a premium of at
least 4.5 percent over treasury rates. 4 Rather than making conservative estimates
of the target's future profits, the LBO lender trivialized the risks to enable the
transaction. 46 The remedy was that the LBO lender lost its security interest
and was subordinated to other creditors of the target.
4 7
The details of the buyout of Jevic are not described with the extraordinary de-
tail of O'Day. Therefore, the fate of a fraudulent transfer claim is unclear. The fact
that the loan was significantly greater immediately after the transaction than the
price paid for Jevic suggests that the LBO loan rendered Jevic insolvent. In ad-
dition, the business appeared unable to turn a profit at any time after the LBO,
suggesting that Jevic may also not have been able to pay its debts as they became
due. However, Jevic's inability to service its debts may have been an unforeseeable
result of the onset of the Great Recession, whereas the reasonable forecast at the
time of the transaction may have been that Jevic would be able to service its
debts, in which case fraudulent transfer liability would be unlikely.
48
4. The Settlement
The creditors of Jevic, by arguing that the leveraged buyout of Jevic violated
fraudulent transfer law, pursued the same remedy. The allegation of a fraudulent
transfer in the LBO of Jevic could have led to subordination of the claims of the
LBO lender, CIT, and the voiding of any transfers from the target, Jevic, to the
the projections themselves were unreasonable."); id. at 412 ("The Court finds that the Bank and Fun-
ston suffered from an overweening optimism about the Debtor's financial abilities, and their own,
which addled their ability to evaluate the company in light of its financial condition in the months
prior to the LBO, and permitted them to disregard the cyclical nature of the Debtor's business and the
industr . )
43. Id. at 375 ("In early 1987, Mentor became aware of Forstmann's desire to sell O'Day .... Due
to its relationship with [Funston], Mentor also was aware that Funston was engaged in the business
of acquiring corporations. Indeed, fJones], a senior lending officer at Mentor, who testified he had
been involved in approximately 10-15 LBO deals in 1986, contacted Funston to inform him
about the sale of O'Day." (footnote omitted)).
44. Id. at 382 ("In an undated letter, [Freal], a Bank officer who worked with Jones, advised Fun-
ston that the amount of fees due Mentor at closing would be $119,263.88.").
45. The one-year treasury rates on June 1987 were about 6.8 percent and the five-year at about
8.4 percent, FED. REs. ECON. REs., fred.stlouisfed.org (last visited June 29, 2017). O'Day's "deferred in-
terest acquisition loan" at 13 percent corresponded to a premium over one-year treasuries of 6.2 per-
cent and 4.6 percent over five-year treasuries. The "term loan" was set at 4.5 percent over treasuries,
unclear which. The "revolving line of credit" was set at 2.75 percent over a "base rate" that is unclear.
Id. at 381 ("Mentor provided the following credit facilities: 1. A term loan .... plus interest payable
monthly at 4.5% above a specified treasury securities yield rate... 2. A revolving line of credit....
with interest payable monthly at 2.75% above Mentor's base rate... 3. A deferred interest acquisition
loan ... ; plus interest payable monthly at 13%
46. See supra note 42.
47. O'Day, 126 B.R. at 413 ("the Court rules that the liens and security interests obtained by Meri-
tor on June 30, 1987 are void ... t;] the Court equitably subordinates all of Mentor's claim").
48. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992) (refusing to impose LBO
fraudulent transfer liability because the forecasts at the time of the LBO were reasonably for solvency
and were upset by the advent of a recession).
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acquirer, Sun. Rather than litigate the issue, the parties reached a settlement. The
settlement had Sun surrender a lien on the debtor's only asset, $1.7 million of
cash, and had CIT contribute $2 million for a total settlement amount of $3.7
million. 
49
Normally, the recipient of these funds would be the estate of the debtor. How-
ever, Sun argued that because the litigation over the employees' inadequate no-
tice (WARN Act) claims was active and included Sun as a defendant, giving the
proceeds of the settlement to the estate would in essence have been financing
litigation against Sun. Therefore, Sun insisted that the settlement should not
fund the employees' litigation against Sun and that the employees be excluded
from the settlement proceeds. Thus, the structured dismissal order that ap-
proved the settlement and ordered its distribution to other creditors was violat-
ing the employees' wage priority claim, as the next subpart explains.
B. THE WAGE AND INADEQUATE NOTICE (WARN ACT) CLAIMS
The employees who were fired on the eve of bankruptcy made two kinds of
prepetition claims, ordinary claims for back wages and inadequate notice
(WARN Act) claims. Employers of more than 100 employees, like Jevic, are sub-
ject to the federal WARN Act's mandate that in the event of a mass layoff, they
give sixty days' notice to their employees. °  New Jersey, where Jevic was head-
quartered, has its own even stricter WARN statute. 51 Recent prepetition claims
for wages, which include those under the WARN Acts, receive (up to $10,000
per employee), a priority that makes them senior to unsecured claims but junior
to administrative and secured claims. 52
Although the federal WARN Act contains exceptions that protect failing busi-
nesses, the New Jersey WARN Act does not. Accordingly, Jevic owed sixty days'
wages to its employees as of the date of their dismissal on the eve of bankruptcy.
5 3
The employees argued that accordingly, they have a claim for $12.4 million, with
49. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 981 (2017).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) ("An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the
end of a 60-day period after the employer serves written notice.").
51. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:21-2 (West 2016) ([T]he employer who operates the establishment or
conducts the mass layoff shall: a. Provide, in the case of an employer who employs 100 or more
full-time employees, not less than 60 days, ..., before the first termination of employment occurs
in connection with the termination or transfer of operations, or mass layoff, notification.").
52. Secured claims are senior-most by virtue of being entitled to the collateral, §§ 725, 1129(b)(2)(A).
Then, administrative priority claims, including legal fees, receive the priority of § 507(a)(2). Prepetition
wage claims, including in this case the WARN Act claims, receive the fourth priority of wages per
§ 507(a)(4) up to $10,000 per employee and, perhaps, although not mentioned in the Jevic record,
the fifth priority of employee benefit plan contributions per § 507(a)(5), again up to $10,000 per em-
ployee. If the employee class dissents, then the plan must give this amount in cash, § 1129(a)(9)(B) ("a
class of claims of a kind specified in section... 507(a)(4), 507(a)(5).... of this title.... will receive...
(ii) if such class has not accepted the plan, cash ... equal to the allowed amount of such claim").
53. In reJevic Holdings Corp., 496 B.R. 151, 165 (Bank. D. Del. 2013) ([T]he Court finds that...
the Debtors are entitled to the Unforeseeable Business Circumstances exceptiont,]" but "that Class
Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery under the New Jersey WARN Act.").
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$8.3 million of that being entitled to the priority of wages." The employees also
turned their WARN Act claims against Sun, but without success." However, the
employees had also received a $6 million payment of back wages on the basis of a
first-day order.56 Not clear on the record is whether the employees' $8.3 million
priority claim accounted for the $6 million they received on the basis of this first-
day order, but probably not.
The exact size of the employees' priority claim is relevant because an impor-
tant factor of the lower courts' analysis was the employees' harm from a rejection
of the settlement and conversion to chapter 7. The lower courts reasoned that the
settlement of the LBO fraudulent transfer claims would not have taken place if
the settlement had been rejected. 7 Therefore, the employees would not have re-
ceived anything more- as a result, the structured dismissal did not hurt them. An
interesting question, however, is how much better the employees would have
fared if the settlement amount was included. If so, the amount that the employ-
ees received in the first-day order would have counted toward their wage prior-
ity, probably leaving only $2.3 million of their WARN Act claims with a wage
priority. The total settlement proceeds of $3.7 million would have fully covered
the employees' wage priority and leave about $1.4 million for other creditors.
This does not account for administrative priority claims, which include the
costs of operating the estate. Administrative claims would have had priority
over the employees' claims. Thus, depending on the exact level of administrative
claims, which should include the litigation about the settlement itself in the
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court, the statement of Jevic's counsel at oral ar-
gument that the employees would receive nothing more either way may be cor-
rect, even if the settlement amount was included.58
54. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 980 (2017) ("The Bankruptcy Court
granted summary judgment for petitioners against Jevic, leaving them (and this is the point to remem-
ber) with a judgment that petitioners say is worth $12.4 million.... Some $8.3 million of that judg-
ment counts as a priority wage claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), and is therefore entitled to pay-
ment ahead of general unsecured claims against the Jevic estate.").
55. Id. at 981 ("Sun prevailed on the ground that Sun was not the workers' employer
56. Jevic Transcript, supra note 28, at 39 (Mr. Landau for Jevic: The employees' "objection would
actually completely come back to bite them because there is no legal difference between a distribution
of assets on the first day where they recovered $6 million in this case in their prepetition wage and
benefit claims.").
57. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 982 ([T]he court predicted that without the settlement and dismissal, there
was 'no realistic prospect' of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors.").
58. Jevic Transcript, supra note 28, at 30 ("Petitioners say that the bankruptcy court here was re-
quired to reject the settlement that made all other unsecured creditors better off without making Pe-
titioners any worse off."). A fuller statement would explain that even if the employees won their
fraudulent transfer attack on the LBO, their remedy would be subordination of CITs claims against
Jevic and recovery of payments to CIT and Sun, about the size of which the record is silent. The pro-
ponents of the plan would then point out that because the estate was administratively insolvent, that
victory would not produce value for the employees. However, because CIT and Sun did provide
$3.7 million in the settlement, the question is to what probability of success of the fraudulent transfer
claim does this settlement correspond, i.e., to what percentage of the recovery if the estate won the
fraudulent transfer case. Because we do not know the total recoverable from CIT and Sun, we cannot
answer. If one believes that the probability of success of a fraudulent transfer attack is high, then the
settlement would only be appropriate if the $3.7 million is a high fraction of the possible recovery.
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However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the structured dismissal ap-
proving the settlement prohibited the employees from pursuing their own fraud-
ulent transfer claims against the acquirer, Sun, and the LBO lender, CIT. There-
fore, even if the employees would get nothing out of Jevic from undoing the
structured dismissal, they might get something from pursuing the LBO fraudu-
lent transfer claims against Sun and CIT outside of bankruptcy, after a simple
dismissal that would restore their right to that attack." The debtor would coun-
ter, however, that an invalidation of the dismissal brings the bankruptcy case
back to life, and that the adjudication of the fraudulent transfer claims is a matter
for the bankruptcy court, wherein the debtor, in light of the administrative insol-
vency, can only pursue those claims by obtaining counsel on a contingency-fee
basis. During oral argument, the employees claimed that this was possible. 60
C. THE NARROW HOLDING: "No" STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
The actual holding of Jevic seems very simple. Dismissals need consent to vi-
olate priorities:
Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distribu-
tions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors' con-
sent? Our simple answer to this complicated question is "no."6
The Jevic court says "no" to nonconsensual structured dismissals. The court does
not deviate from the guidance of the ABI Chapter 11 Reform Report, which also dis-
approves of structured dismissals .62 This "no" of Jevic, however, is qualified.
First, consensual structured dismissals, about which the court was silent, re-
main proper. 63 However, the court gave no guidance as to whether a class ap-
proval suffices or if the objecting minority in a class may still block a structured
dismissal. In other words, what is unclear is whether the creditor's right to object
to a structured dismissal is an individual right or a class right. A broad reading
would argue for an individual right, in which case the number of structured dis-
missals that would be consensual is vanishingly small. A reading in the context
59. Jevc, 137 S. Ct. at 983 ("Or the court could simply dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
thereby allowing petitioners to assert the fraudulent-conveyance claim themselves.").
60. Jevc Transcript, supra note 28, at 5 (Ms. Spinelli: "The trustee would have to retain contin-
gency counsel, and that does happen. I was involved in a Chapter 7 case where the trustee pursued
an avoidance action successfully with contingency counsel.").
61. Jevc, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
62. ABI CHAPTER I 11 REFORM R PoRT, supra note 18, at 293 (stating that the Commission agreed that
only statutory exits be strictly approved, i.e., plans, conversions, and the court may "dismiss a case
provided that the requested dismissal and the dismissal order satisfy the applicable provisions of, and
do not permit the parties to work around, the Bankruptcy Code").
63. One may wonder about the possibility that the court may later expand this "no" to even con-
sensual structured dismissals. This seems highly unlikely. An attempt to prohibit consensual struc-
tured dismissals would be practically almost pointless because virtually all such dismissals could
also be presented as reorganization plans deserving approval by virtue of being consensual (the caveat
regards some rights of priority claimants to accelerated payment, see injra note 70). Moreover, the
court's dicta in favor of first-day orders imply that some nonconsensual structured dismissals must
be proper, see injra text accompanying note 65, which negates dogmatic opposition to structured
dismissals.
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of § 1129 finds that Jevic recognizes only a class right to object to a structured
dismissal. Minority dissenters in the reorganization setting, according to this
reading, only receive rights analogous to those they have under § 1129. Because
§ 1129 only gives individual dissenters a right to their liquidation value, a struc-
tured dismissal that gives minority dissenters of a consenting class their liquida-
tion value could be argued to be proper. The creation of an individual right by
Jevic also seems counter to the structure of § 1129 and that of chapter 11. When
§ 1129 grants rights to claimants, those are usually class rights, and only by ex-
ception are they individual rights-a drafting principle that should carry over to
Jevic. The structure of chapter 11 is inimical to individual holdouts, whereas an
individual right to object to a structured dismissal would create a holdout prob-
lem, giving veto power in every individual creditor over a structured dismissal.
This silence of Jevic allows different circuit courts to develop interpretations of
Jevic on this aspect that may differ.
Second, the court discusses Iridiurm's priority-violating settlement with ap-
proval.64 The court's dicta approving and distinguishing Iridium are the second
exception to Jevic's "no." The Jevic opinion does not disapprove of settlements
that exclude claimants from their proceeds, provided that, like Iridium, they
are in interim orders rather than final orders (and that the violation furthers a
bankruptcy reason, such as Iridiurm's attempt to enlarge the estate as discussed
below in Part IV.C). The following question then arises: what difference
would the new rule have made to this particular settlement? The pertinent exer-
cise asks whether the settlement could have been approved as an interim order,
as in Iridium, pending the resolution of the WARN Act litigation against the ac-
quirer, Sun. However, if the approval of the settlement was an interim order,
then the next question is whether it could also make an interim distribution
of the assets to the unsecured creditors, either excluding the employees-
which seems highly unlikely, especially because the settlement cannot be seen
as financing an attempt to increase the estate-or reserving assets for paying
the employees after the resolution of the WARN Act litigation against Sun.
The absence of an interim distribution would make the settlement much less ap-
pealing to the unsecured creditors, perhaps even pointless for them, but it would
make it more appealing to employees. In addition, this would render Sun's in-
sistence that the proceeds of the settlement not be shared with the employees
pointless because the proceeds would not finance the litigation against Sun.
The litigation would be over, and the proceeds could be distributed according
to priorities. Thus, turning the agreement into an interim order would eliminate
its disagreement with priorities, which shows that the Jevic opinion does have a
substantive thrust: to uphold the Code's distribution scheme.
Third, the Jevic opinion offers a class of exceptions for first-day orders that
would be appropriate:
64. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 ("We recognize that Iridium is not the only case in which a court has
approved interim distributions that violate ordinary priority rules. But in such instances one can gen-
erally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-violating distributions serve.").
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Courts, for example, have approved "first-day" wage orders that allow payment of
employees' prepetition wages, "critical vendor" orders that allow payment of essen-
tial suppliers' prepetition invoices, and "roll-ups" that allow lenders who continue
financing the debtor to be paid first on their prepetition claims ... In doing so,
these courts have usually found that the distributions at issue would "enable a suc-
cessful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off."6
A twist on the Jevic facts reveals the exception. Suppose that in the first-day
order, which paid $6 million to the workers, Jevic had negotiated and obtained
a waiver by the workers of their WARN Act and fraudulent transfer claims (both
types of claims were clearly foreseeable). Then, at an identical structured dismis-
sal, the workers objected so as to pursue their waived claims. The workers' ob-
jections would obviously be improper in that they would contradict the waiver
of their further claims. Because the Supreme Court's dicta indicate that such a
first-day order would be proper, this nonconsensual structured dismissal should
also be proper. In many circumstances, a proper first-day order would imply that
its beneficiary cannot object to the structured dismissal that upholds the order's
consequences.
IV. THROUGH THE MIRROR: UNDERCURRENTS AND EXPANSIONS
Thus, the dicta about first-day orders take special importance, as does the hid-
den issue regarding potential biases about legal fees and settlements, their pro-
priety, and the potential divergence between the class appropriate to litigate
them versus settling, the four issues to which Part IV turns.
A. FIRST-DAY ORDERS
The guidance that the Court offers about first-day orders is limited to the dic-
tum that they must benefit the estate and, thus, also dissenting creditors by
"enabl[ing] a successful reorganization and mak[ing] even the disfavored credi-
tors better off. "66 At oral argument, the Solicitor General pointed out that first-
day orders that truly benefit the estate are supported by senior creditors and ar-
gued that first-day orders should be conditional on senior creditors' approval.67
However, the court did not approve of this expressly stringent standard. Rather,
its dicta supported a first-day order practice that is guided by benefitting the es-
tate and, thus, "even disfavored creditors" without expressly requiring the disfa-
vored creditors' approval. An interesting puzzle regards the application of this
standard to the first-day order paying the employees inJevic itself. The business
65. Id. at 985 (citations omitted).
66. Id. (quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004)).
67. Jevic Transcript, supra note 28, at 21 (Ms. Harrington: "So in our view, tinterim] distributions
in Chapter 11 that violate the priority scheme are not permissible under any circumstances unless
there is consent of the impaired priority claimholder. And so critical vendor orders, if they are
done over the objection of the-of the claimholder who twas] skipped, we think those are not per-
missible ....").
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was already closing down. Thus, it was not easy to support a bankruptcy reason
for the first-day order. Granted, Jevic needed some employees for the shutting
down. 68 However, Jevic did not present a true necessity for continued services in
the broad and unqualified nature of the order (i.e., the payment to all employees).
Juxtaposing this first-day order-the unqualified payment of back wages to
employees-with the corresponding recommendation of the ABI Chapter II Re-
form Report is revealing. The recommendation is to make routine the payment of
back wages with no court approval .69 This reveals the likely reasoning behind
the first-day order in Jevic. Although many employees were not likely necessary
for Jevic's reorganization, the practice has developed to pay back wages on a
first-day order due to their priority (and up to it). The way the facts unfolded,
however, also shows the problems that this creates. Whereas the estate did
not truly need the employees' service because the business closed, the absence
of those funds made the estate administratively insolvent and unable to exit
the reorganization process properly. Jevic changes this practice for settings
where no bankruptcy reason exists to retain all employees (i.e., in most liquidat-
ing reorganizations) .
7
The payment of the employees on a first-day order in Jevic did not meet the
standard that the court set. The employees were not necessary for a reorganiza-
tion. Thus, no bankruptcy reason existed for this payment. Although the Jevic
employees were victorious, the decision hurts similarly situated employees by
scrutinizing their payments. The dicta strongly indicate that first-day orders to
pay employees without a bankruptcy reason are not proper. Paying the employ-
ees with less haste may have created the space for a settlement that would have
reduced litigation and sped resolution. A more deliberate negotiation with the
employees might have led to a deal that addressed their (easily foreseeable)
WARN Act claims and LBO fraudulent transfer claims. This kind of order
68. The employees that Jevic needed were mostly those necessary to complete pending deliveries
and to return its trucks to their bases, see Dan Dooley, Jevic Holding Corp.-The Supreme Court Issue
and Ruling, and the Impact on Future Chapter 11 Cases (May 2017) (unpublished presentation, ex-
cerpt archived at https://perma.cc/4BGF-WV44) (discussing the completion of shipments and recov-
ery of every single tractor and 98 percent of trailers; Mr. Dooley of Morris Anderson was the Chief
Restructuring Officer of Jevic, overseeing its slide into bankruptcy and its liquidation).
69. ABI CHPTR 11 R R paR, supra note 18, at 92 ("section 549 should be amended to per-
mit the trustee to pay prepetition employee wages, other compensation, and benefit plan contribu-
tions up to the per employee priority limit without requiring the filing of a motion or order of the
court")
70. A potential future conflict, however, is visible. Section 1129 requires the accelerated payment of
some priority claims, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (including "(B) with respect to a class of claims of a kind
specified in section 507(a)(1), 507(a)(4) ]priority wages], 507(a)(5) ]priority benefits], 507(a)(6), or
507(a)(7) of this title, each holder of a claim of such class will receive... (ii) if such class has not ac-
cepted the plan, cash on the effective date of the plan equal to the allowed amount of such claim"). The
outstanding priority claims of employees, then, make liquidating reorganization plans that do not have
sufficient assets violate § 1 129(a)(9). The interpretation favorable to liquidating plans is that these rights
are contingent on the existence of the value to make those payments, because conversion to chapter
seven would not produce additional value. An insistence on a narrow reading of the text, however,
would require conversions to chapter seven that would be, in essence, pointless and costly.
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would have avoided the many trips to the courthouse on the WARN Act claims
and would have helped resolve the estate.
Thus, the most pronounced consequence of Jevic is that a new practice will
develop about orders to pay employees in liquidating reorganizations, likely
waiving further claims, accepting setoffs, or allowing marshalling of the payment
against future priority claims. The Jevic problems would not have arisen if the
employees had waived their rights to separately wage a fraudulent transfer attack
against the LBO, and the setting would be much simpler if it had been clear that
the payment the employees received would count against any additional priority
claims that the employees would obtain.
The first undercurrent of Jevic requires this more cautious approach to first-day
orders. The payment must be truly necessary- it must have a bankruptcy reason.
Perhaps a closed business without assets that need active care can still pay back
wages early, but more deliberation and negotiation should ensure that the pay-
ment also resolves pending issues, making "even disfavored creditors better off. "71
B. BIASES ABOUT FEES
The debate on the agency costs of bankruptcy professionals is intense. Profes-
sor Lynn LoPucki has created a long trail of scholarship arguing that the Code's
ease of forum selection combined with the willingness of some courts to compete
for bankruptcy filings has produced an environment in which legal fees are out
of control, and the courts' actual discretion is in some ways limited.72 On the
other side of this debate, Professor Stephen Lubben argues that competition
among bankruptcy professionals is true and intense, mitigating concerns, and
that the proffered evidence can be explained by fees being commensurate to
the difficulty of the various categories of cases.73 Notice the parallel nature of
this debate to the debate in corporate law scholarship about whether state com-
petition produces a race to the bottom (i.e., is perniciously facilitating managerial
71. Jevic 137 S. Ct. at 985.
72. Professor LoPucki has two books and numerous articles on the issue. See generally LYNN Lo-
PuCKt, COURTING FILURE (2005); LYNN LoPcutK &JOSEPH DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE BANK-
RUPTCIE: DATA, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION (2011); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure oj Public
Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence oj a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND.
L. REV. 231, 232-37 (2001).
73. Stephen J. Lubben, American Bankruptcy Institute Chapter II Fee Study (Seton Hall Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 1020477, 2007); Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter II as Intrigue: A Review oj LoPucki
and Doherty's Projessional Fees in Corporate Bankruptcies, 28 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. (Canada) 171
(2012); Stephen J. Lubben, What We "Know" About Chapter II Cost Is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 141 (2012); Stephen J. Lubben, Professional Fees in Corporate Bankruptcies: Data, Analysis
and Evaluation, ABI J., Apr. 2011, at 60; Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Projessional
Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Cor-
porate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CtN. L. REv. 1243 (2000) (competition beneficial); Barry E. Adler
& Henry N. Butler, On the "Delawarization oj Bankruptcy" Debate, 52 EMoRY LJ. 1309 (2003) (down-
playing importance of observed jurisdictional competition in U.S. bankruptcy); Marcus Cole, "Dela-
ware Is Not a State": Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. Rrv. 1845
(2002).
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overreach 74) or a race to the top (i.e., is desirably producing efficient gover-
nance 75 and speedy litigation7 6). Again, juxtaposing the corporate law develop-
ment, the Supreme Court had the opportunity in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
to let federal securities law supplant a significant fraction of state corporate law
by allowing securities fraud to address practices covered by state fiduciary obli-
gations, but it refused to do so.
7 7
The Jevic facts offered the court an opportunity to address this debate explic-
itly, and perhaps it did implicitly. The court could have addressed fees explicitly
by noting that the settlement produced funds that would pay the bankruptcy
professionals, whereas the alternative of a straight dismissal would not. If the set-
tlement was not approved, and the administrative insolvency led to a straight
dismissal, that would produce the possibility of other lawyers pursuing the em-
ployees' reinstated fraudulent transfer claims. Thus, the suspicion may be cre-
ated that the structured dismissal was colored by the bankruptcy court's gener-
osity toward the bankruptcy professionals. If the Supreme Court was strongly
concerned about this attitude regarding fees, then the court, noting this dy-
namic, may have expressly imposed higher standards in settings where a bank-
ruptcy court's generosity regarding fees might create bias. Granted, the issue was
not raised by either the litigants or any of the amici, but the Supreme Court
could have moved in that direction, and it did not. Akin to not interfering
with the equivalent corporate law issue, the Supreme Court refrained from ex-
pressly intervening on these facts. However, the Supreme Court's opinion
could also be interpreted as being consistent with a skeptical attitude about gen-
erosity toward fees because it disapproved of the result. This also means that the
opinion did not have to also address concerns about fees. For practice, the cau-
tious course may be to point out these tensions to the court when seeking ap-
provals of transactions that raise issues about generosity toward fee applications
so that the court may address the tension explicitly.
74. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Cor-
porate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure
oj Corporation Law, 89 CoLM. L. REv. 1461 (1989); see also Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks oj Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
75. See, e.g., Robert Dames, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. EcoN. 525 (2001);
Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market jor Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225 (1985);
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977).
76. The Delaware Supreme Court itself points out the standard of expeditiousness that its open-
ness to emergency trials and appeals sets: A takeover defense instituted on April 17 and challenged on
the same day produced a temporary restraining order on April 29 and, after a hearing, certification of
its appealability on May 14. The Supreme Court of Delaware accepted the case the same day, "re-
ceived excellent briefs from the parties, heard argument on May 16 and announced tits] oral ruling
in open court at 9:00 a.m. on May 17." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 &
n.5 (Del. 1985).
77. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (refusing to impose securities fraud liability on conduct that corre-
sponded to violations of state corporate fiduciary obligations).
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C. SETTLEMENT PROPRIETY
The Jevic opinion, on the surface, did not touch on settlement incentives.
However, by juxtaposing Iridium, the opinion makes the distinguishing of the
two settlements necessary, which this subpart does. That distinction rests on
the corresponding incentives, which raise issues that the subsequent subpart ex-
plores. The distortion of settlement incentives due to fees has a rich trail of scho-
larship. 78 This agency cost problem gets more pronounced in the triangular set-
ting of settlements in bankruptcy, like those of Iridium or Jevic.
A stylized version of the Iridium facts illustrates the problem. Suppose that the
unsecured creditors have a 60 percent chance of avoiding a lien of Chase in assets
of the debtor worth $140 and a 20 percent chance of imposing liability on Motorola
for mismanagement and breach of contract, in which case, Motorola would be liable
for $2,500. Outside of bankruptcy, to Iridium itself, those claims would be worth,
respectively, about $84 (60 percent of $140) and $500 (20 percent of $2,500) as-
suming Iridium was neutral toward risk. 7 The claims would produce mirror images
for the corresponding obligors, being worth a loss of $84 to Chase and of $500 to
Motorola. This produces a relatively narrow range of values where a settlement
could be reached for each claim. The addition of legal fees that do not shift to
the loser widens the settlement range.8° The example is based on extrapolations
from the actual numbers in Iridium, in millions.81
In bankruptcy, however, a settlement with Chase that finances the litigation
against Motorola has numerous additional consequences. Focus, first,82 on that,
78. This research has two main strands, one on the effect of contingent fees on settlements
and one on the effect of the award of attorney's fees ("British rule"). See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An
Asymmetric-Injormation Model oj Litigation, 22 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 153 (2002); Steven Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods jor the Allocation oj Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEcAL STUD. 55 (1982); GORDON TULLOCK, TRALS ON TRIAL- THE PUR THEORY O LEcAL PRO-
CEDUR (1980); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success oj
Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEcAL STUD. 1 (1996); Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen & John Panzar, An Eco-
nomic Analysis ojAlternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984); Lester Brick-
man, ABA Regulation oj Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FoaRHM L. Rrv. 247 (1996);
Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise oj Re-
verse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 320 (2005); Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey oj the Law,
Ethics, and Economics oj Attorney Contingent Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Yi. ScH. L. Rrv. 773 (2010);
Note, Fee Shifting: Perspectives jor EAJA Rejormers, 28 LL. & PoL. 371 (2013).
79. If Iridium and the other parties were averse toward risk then uncertain claims are worth a little
less and uncertain obligations are worth a little more (again a little less if they are seen as negative
numbers). The example will continue assuming risk-neutrality without repeating these caveats.
80. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods
jor the Allocation oj Legal Costs, 11 J. LEcAL STUD. 55 (1982); see also supra note 78.
81. The settlement with Chase funded $42.5 million of fees, $37.5 million for the litigation against
Motorola and $5 million in general fees and provided no other direct payments. The unsecured cred-
itors sought to invalidate as avoidable preferences transfers of about $140 million into bank accounts
that were collateral for Chase (90 percent of transfers into accounts of size about $156 million). The
claim against Motorola was worth "billions" and is here estimated at $2.5 billion from the fact that
Iridium entered bankruptcy with debts of about $4 billion after having recently borrowed $1.55 bil-
lion from Chase by pledging all its assets as collateral. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452,
456-61 (2d Cir. 2007).
82. A second interesting curiosity of the settlement, to be discussed in the next subpart, was that
the litigation that it financed was pursued by the committee of unsecured creditors. Yet, any recov-
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by financing the litigation against Motorola, the settlement likely raises the prob-
ability of a victory. Suppose the probability of a victory increases by 5 percent.
This effect means that a settlement with Chase also produces a gain of $125 (5 per-
cent of $2,500) to the value of the claim against Motorola. Suppose the legal fees
that the settlement funds are $42.5. This means that the estate of Iridium sees an
advantage to settling the litigation against Chase at any value above $1.5 (the $84
initial value of the claim reduced by the gain of $125 in the value of the claim
against Motorola and then increased by the $42.5 in legal fees that Chase must
pay). From Chase's perspective, the settlement range increases in a favorable direc-
tion. A claim that would previously seem destined for trial or settlement with
Chase paying about $84 now has a settlement range from Chase paying $1.5 to
Chase paying $84. Whereas these numbers give the impression that this phenom-
enon is a result of the large size of the claim against Motorola, it can also arise with
a smaller claim, if the probability of prevailing changes more from the funding of
the litigation .
3
The point is that the triangular dynamic makes the estate willing to settle
against Chase with terms agreeable to Chase to strengthen the estate's position
against Motorola. If Motorola settled at the new increased value for the estate
of the claim, then the estate would have gained significantly. However, Motorola
chose to litigate. After a very lengthy trial on only the issue of undercapitaliza-
tion, Motorola prevailed 84 The remaining counts against Motorola were dis-
missed as part of a final global settlement a few months later.85
eries that the litigation would bring would accrue 37.5 percent to Chase according to the settlement
terms, and the remaining 62.5 percent that would go to the estate would in large part go to Motorola,
as an administrative creditor. Thus, the greatest economic interest opposite Motorola was that of
Chase but the litigation was directed by the unsecured creditors' committee. Indium, 478 F.3d at
459 ("The Lenders led by Chase] would take 37.5 percent of any recovery. The other 62.5 percent
of the recovery would go to the Estate, to be distributed according to a future, as-yet-unconfirmed
reorganization plan, with administrative creditors-such as Motorola-taking first.")
83. For instance, the example would remain unchanged if the claim against Motorola were $250
and the funding of the litigation increased the chance of the debtor's success by 50 percent, giving the
same $125 gain for the estate from funding the litigation. Increasing the legal fees would narrow the
settlement range.
84. The bankruptcy court stressed the extraordinary nature of the trial-
Following years of fact and expert discovery, pretrial motions and the submission of a final pre-
trial order, the parties, in consultation with the Court, consented to bifurcate the trial in order to
streamline what otherwise would have been an unwieldy and prolonged proceeding. The first
phase of the trial, by agreement, was limited to the questions of whether Iridium was insolvent
or had unreasonably small capital during the four-year period prior to commencement of the
bankruptcy case. Even with this agreement to limit the issues, this phase of the trial was unusu-
ally long-fifty trial days. Opening arguments took place on October 23, 2006; closing argu-
ments were presented on June 5, 2007. Between the opening argument and the closing, 52 wit-
nesses testified, including 7 experts, and 866 exhibits were admitted into evidence. The parties
submitted detailed post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and post-trial
briefs.
In re Iridium Operating LLC, No. 99-45005, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. Aug. 31, 2007) (Opinion
Regarding Insolvency and Unreasonably Small Capital) {archived at https://perma.ccI6JXE-ZGDL].
85. In re Iridium Operating LLC, No. 99-45005 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. May 20, 2008) (Order Pursuant
to Sec. 105, 362 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankr. Rule 9019 Approving a Global Settle-
ment of Disputes Between and/or among the Debtors, the Statutory Committee of Unsecured Cred-
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The dynamics of theJevic settlement had a sharp difference. Instead of the set-
tlement producing an opportunity to enlarge the estate and recoveries, the
settlement sought to reduce those opportunities for the employees. The employ-
ees were pursuing litigation in an attempt to impose liability on the acquirer,
Sun, for the failure of the debtor to give adequate notice of its mass layoffs ac-
cording to the WARN Act. The committee of unsecured creditors settled the
LBO fraudulent transfer claims against Sun and CIT, but Sun did not want
that settlement to finance the employees' WARN Act litigation against Sun.
Therefore, Sun sought to exclude the employees from the proceeds of the settle-
ment. The proceeds of the settlement also paid the legal fees, and because the
case was ripe for dismissal, the court entered the structured dismissal order,
which also precluded the employees from pursuing Sun and CIT under fraudu-
lent transfer theories. Rather than funding a project to enlarge the estate, the set-
tlement avoided funding the employees' litigation 86
If the Supreme Court had not allowed the question presented to change from
propriety of settlements to propriety of structured dismissals, then the opinion
would have addressed settlements and might have distinguished that of Jevic
from that of Iridium. Nevertheless, the court offered approving dicta for the set-
tlement of Iridium because it had the potential to enlarge the estate.87 Thus, the
dicta of Jevic do distinguish the two settlements exactly on that issue. The settle-
ment in Iridium had the advantage of financing a potential enlargement of the
estate, which Jevic's did not. If a settlement entails priority violations, bankruptcy
reasons must justify them, such as the opportunity to enlarge the estate that Irid-
iurn's settlement produced.
D. LITIGATING AND SETTLING INCENTIVES
This focus on Iridium reveals an additional complexity. Consider whether, in
Iridium, the unsecured creditors' committee was the appropriate entity to pursue
the litigation against Motorola. Because the secured creditor was Chase, and be-
cause Chase would gain from immediate increases in the value of the estate, one
could think that the proper entity to pursue the litigation was Chase. However,
focusing on the payout of the litigation suggests that the unsecured creditors'
committee may well have been the correct entity to pursue the litigation.
Granted, the litigation against Motorola may have had a low probability of suc-
itors, the Debtors' Prepetition Secured Lenders and Motorola, Inc.) [archived at https://perma.cc/
28UJ-9HU8] ("dismissing the Motorola Litigation").
86. The other side of this asks if Sun and CIT truly were willing to settle the fraudulent transfer
claims at their probability-adjusted value, was the consent of the employees necessary? The answer is
no, as long as the proceeds of the settlement follow priorities. To avoid financing the employees' lit-
igation, the amount that the employees would be entitled to receive could be made subject to a mech-
anism delaying its distribution, such as a trust.
87. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (after distinguishing Iridium as
an interim order rather than a final one, the opinion proceeds to stress what the Jevic settlement did
not do, in an implicit juxtaposition to that of Indium and proper first-day orders, including that the
Jevic settlement "does not make the disfavored creditors better off; it does not promote the possibility
of a confirmable plan").
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cess, but it also had an enormous potential gain. Because the secured creditors
would only experience a limited gain, they would not capture the marginal gains
from the litigation and would be undermotivated to pursue it. Their incentives
would only be to optimally produce the recovery that would cover their claim
rather than the (potentially larger) optimal recovery. Incentives are appropriate
for the entity that bears the marginal effect of decisions. The unsecured creditors
could have the optimal litigation incentives if they experienced the gain in reac-
tion to marginal adjustments in litigation strategy, to wit, the award increase
from the marginal motion or objection.
This analysis also reveals that the unsecured creditors may not have had the
appropriate incentives to settle the Motorola litigation, despite having the appro-
priate incentives to litigate it. If the probability of success was very low, then the
probability-adjusted amount at which a settlement was reasonable could have
not led to a payout for the unsecured creditors. Even if Motorola was willing
to settle at the probability-adjusted value of the claim, that settlement might
only produce a payout for Chase. The settlement, then, would be unappealing
for the unsecured creditors.
Bankruptcy law is silent about the proper standards for evaluating this setting
despite the fact that the equivalent setting in corporate law is known and ad-
dressed by a shift of fiduciary duties.88 The silence of bankruptcy law is under-
standable because the Code envisions close supervision by the court that would
make the decision. In addition, the stratification of the classes can mean that no
class has the perfect incentives to settle, as was likely the case in Iridium.89 In
Jevic, the willingness of the unsecured creditors to settle should be suspect in-
stead of being relied upon by the lower courts, because the settlement gave
value to the unsecured creditors to which they would not be entitled according
to priorities.
88. When the choice of the board of directors is between a risky course of action which, if suc-
cessful, will benefit shareholders, but if unsuccessful will impose losses on creditors, and a safe
course of action that does not produce gains for the shareholders, the board of directors in choosing
must not promote the interests of shareholders alone, as fiduciary duties become broader. See, e.g.,
Geyer v. Irgensoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 791 (Del. 1992) ("[T]he fact of insolvency ... causes
fiduciary duties to creditors to arise."); In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240,
256-57 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("A]s directors of a corporation in the 'zone of insolvency,' the NCS
board members also owe fiduciary duties to the Company's creditors."); Credit Lyonnais Bank Neder-
land, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991) ("At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is
not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.").
89. The unsecured creditors would not have had the incentive to settle if the settlement did not
provide them with any payout, already discussed above. Neither the secured creditors, Chase, would
have the proper incentives to settle. The secured creditors would settle too easily because they would
only capture part of the upside from a trial. Using the numbers of the example, the probability-
adjusted value of the claim was 20 percent of $2,500 or $500. Therefore, a fair settlement should
be in that neighborhood. Chase's secured claim was for only $1,550, meaning that for Chase a victory
only brings up to that amount (minus what Chase gets already on the basis of its security interests).
Even if Chase were getting nothing on its security interests, Chase would be willing to accept any
offer of Motorola to settle at above 20 percent of $1,550 or $310, rather than an offer close to
$500. The fact that in the Indium settlement Chase accepted to limit the upside of its secured
claim could mean that Chase would be willing to settle at terms much more favorable to Motorola.
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Moreover, the Buttner9 ° principle would argue that a settlement that would
occur outside of bankruptcy should not be prevented by bankruptcy without a
bankruptcy reason. Therefore, if Motorola were willing to settle the claim at
about its probability-adjusted value, then the circumstances of bankruptcy should
not stand in the way of a settlement. The procedures of bankruptcy must be sen-
sitive to this. Outside bankruptcy, Motorola could at any moment during the trial
decide to settle. In bankruptcy, however, Motorola's opponent was not an appro-
priate party with whom to settle. Thus, the court must at all moments be open to a
settlement hearing at Motorola's request while being cognizant that Chase would
likely support a settlement too easily, whereas the unsecured creditors would
likely object even to a generous settlement.
V. CONCLUSION
This article went on a journey that was spurred by Jevic's "no" to structured
dismissals. The sights on this journey were (a) the pending clarification of
whether nonconsensual structured dismissals arise from individual creditor ob-
jections or only from the objection of a class- (b) the increased scrutiny on first-
day orders, especially in liquidating reorganizations- (c) advised caution on po-
tential biases from generosity about fees- (d) the continued propriety of interim
approvals of settlements provided any priority violations are overcome by bank-
ruptcy reasons, such as opportunities to enlarge the estate as in Iridium; and
(e) that the class appropriate to litigate likely may not have the appropriate in-
centives to settle a dispute, but that the court should be open to a settlement.
Whereas at his closing at oral argument, Jevic's counsel warned against mak-
ing the Bankruptcy Code into a "suicide pact,"'91 the opinion's narrow holding
certainly does not do so. By revealing these complexities, the door opens for fur-
ther cautious refinement of reorganization law by the lower courts.
90. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (not altering state law outcome absent a bank-
ruptcy reason).
91. Jevic Transcript, supra note 28, at 62.
